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THE CORPORATE CHAMELEON
Megan Wischmeier Shaner *
INTRODUCTION
Since the adoption of the first American general incorporation
statutes in the late nineteenth century, corporate law has contemplated three distinct actors involved in the corporation—directors,
stockholders, and officers.1 Today, officers are widely considered
among the most central, if not the central, figures in corporate governance. Yet they are the least theorized participants.2 While corporate statutes and case law make clear the identities of directors
* Associate Dean for Research & Scholarship; Professor of Law, The University of
Oklahoma College of Law. For helpful comments and discussions, I would like to thank Afra
Afsharipour, Brad Bernthal, Wendy Netter Epstein, Charlie Korsmo, Christopher Odinet,
and Christina Sautter. I would also like to thank the participants in the National Business
Law Scholars Conference, the Law and Society Annual Meeting, and BYU Law School’s
Winter Deals Conference whose thoughtful comments and questions contributed to the completion of this Article.
1. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 10, 1899, ch. 273, § 5, 21 Del. Laws 446 (1899) (granting corporations power “[t]o appoint such officers and agents as the business of the corporation
shall require, and to allow them suitable compensation.” (emphasis added)); see also 1 R.
FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS &
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, § History (3d ed. Supp. II 2019) (providing a brief history of the
General Corporation Law of the state of Delaware); 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
COX & HAZEN ON CORPORATIONS 87–90 (2d ed. 2003) (describing the first American general
incorporation acts); Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History
and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 896 (1990) (“Delaware adopted its first modern general
corporation law in 1899.”); S. Samuel Arsht, A History of Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 1 (1976) (discussing the early history of Delaware corporate law).
2. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 108 (3d ed. 2009) (“In fact, most corporation statutes do not even mention
the position of chief executive officer (CEO), the most important single organizational role
in the large majority of corporations.”); Deborah A. DeMott, Corporate Officers as Agents,
74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 847, 848 (2017) (“Although officers are crucial to explaining how
corporations function, scholarly and theoretical accounts of corporate law and governance
tend to slight officers’ positions as well as the distinctive quality of their duties.”); Jennifer
O’Hare, Private Ordering and Improving Information Flow to the Board of Directors: The
Duty To Inform Bylaw, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 557, 563 (2019) (“Given the importance of the
role played by officers in corporations, as well as the use of the term in several corporate
statutes, it is curious that neither the Delaware legislature nor the Delaware judiciary have
defined ‘officer’ for purposes of corporate law.”); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Governance
After Enron, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 99, 108–09 (2003) (“[T]here is almost nothing in corporate
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and stockholders, officers are left relatively undefined.3 Over 120
years after the creation of modern corporation law, “Who is an ‘officer’ of a corporation?” remains an open question. The definitional
uncertainty surrounding “officer” is problematic at the individual,
institutional, judicial, and legislative levels. Categorization as a
corporate officer carries with it distinct legal duties, rights, and
liabilities. Currently, individuals, boards, and their counsel are left
to speculate as to “officer” status. Lacking in established definitional boundaries, parties opportunistically define “officer” to fit
their particular argument, causing judicial analysis and rulemaking as it pertains to corporate officers to become inconsistent and
unpredictable.
Historically, corporate codes identified a handful of officers that
every corporation should, and in some cases, must have.4 Over the
years, the adoption of statutory reforms largely stripped out all
references to any particular office or title. Corporate statutes contemplate a distinct “officer” category, but refrain from articulating
that role with any specificity, leaving it up to corporations to do so
in their governing documents.5 Corporations have, however, refrained, through private ordering in their bylaws or otherwise,
from clarifying the term “officer.”6 In fact, corporations have done
the opposite; through exercising the freedom of contract provided
under the enabling regime of modern corporate law, corporations
have muddied the definitional waters, fashioning officer titles in
myriad ways and giving titles to countless people, many of whom
lack traditional officer responsibilities and authority. Over the
years corporate law has developed in such a way that identifying
the officers of a corporation, as that role is contemplated in corporate jurisprudence, is arguably a more challenging task than it has
ever been.

statutes about the duties of officers . . . .”).
3. See Verity Winship, Jurisdiction over Corporate Officers and the Incoherence of Implied Consent, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1171, 1195–96 (“‘Officer’ means . . . who-knows-what for
triggering state-law fiduciary duties.”).
4. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (1967) (requiring corporations to have “a
president, secretary, and treasurer”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 50 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969).
5. See, e.g., § 142(a) (2019) (“Every corporation organized under this chapter shall have
such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution
of the board of directors . . . .”).
6. See O’Hare, supra note 2, at 566 (finding that the bylaws of the fifty largest U.S.
public corporations provide little information about officers or their duties beyond basic
boilerplate provisions).
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In addition to state corporate codes, federal securities law, jurisdictional statutes, and bankruptcy law all make reference to the
corporate “officer.” Each defining “officer” in slightly different
terms, courts disagree over the proper interpretation of “officer”
and the proper identification of persons occupying this role.7 A contributing factor to the inconsistent interpretations is the lack of a
“north star” definition in state corporate law for courts to look to
for guidance. The resulting definitional fluidity within and across
disciplines means that individuals can move in and out of “officer”
status in a chameleon-like fashion depending on the context and
jurisdiction in which they operate.8
To be sure, this chameleon-like result is not exclusive to the term
“officer.” There are many words in the English language that take
on new or specialized meanings depending on the area of law or
jurisdiction in which one is operating. Moreover, legal definitions
can expand, contract, or be transformed into new definitions depending on the context in which a word or phrase is being used.
The variable nature of words in the law becomes problematic, however, when there is a lack of established consensus and clarity in
defining a term. Linguistic precision is vital to the development,
practice, and application of the law, but to achieve this, there needs
to be clear delineation of a term’s legal meaning(s). This is necessary for individuals to understand their legal responsibilities and
authority, and for lawyers and judges to communicate efficiently
and effectively. If left unresolved, definitions will be determined ex
post, allowing parties to opportunistically define terms to fit their
particular argument or position.
While limited in scope, “officer” scholarship to date has focused
on identifying the authority, responsibility, and liability of these
individuals. Research in this area (including that written by this
author) avoids the messy step of having to delineate with precision
“officer” status in a corporation.9 However, before officer jurisprudence is further developed by the courts or scholars, the threshold
7. See, e.g., infra Sections II.A–B.
8. See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 114 (1986) (stating that where to
draw the line on who is an “officer” is “not always clear” and categorization as an “officer”
can differ depending on the context at issue).
9. See, e.g., O’Hare, supra note 2, at 566; Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Officer Accountability, 32 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 357, 359 n.3 (2016) (focusing primarily on senior executive
officers when discussing “officers” under corporate law); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Dominance
by Inaction: Delaware’s Long Silence on Corporate Officers n.9 (Wash. & Lee Univ. Sch. of
Law Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2017-11, 2017), http://ssrn.com/labstrait=2964033
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question of “To whom does the doctrine apply?” needs to be answered. Corporate governance specifies different consequences
that attach to the different categories of corporate actors. It is both
normatively and practically problematic to decide consequences
without reference to a clearly defined category.
Defining “officer” has become particularly pressing in light of the
private ordering movement in corporate law. With increasing frequency, parties are structuring key aspects of corporate governance through private contracting methods.10 Observing that the
ambiguity surrounding officers in corporate law makes it a ripe
topic for private ordering, the American Bar Association (“ABA”)
has created a Task Force on Officer Liability charged with developing ways of addressing uncertainties in officer doctrine and developing model provisions suitable for use in employment agreements and governing documents.11 Integral to these efforts will be
establishing a clear consensus on the legal default definition of “officer.” As individual corporations and their stockholders begin to
attempt to structure the governance of their entity through provisions in the governing documents or contract, clarity as to whom
the law views as an “officer” is critical.
This Article seeks to address what is currently missing from corporate law—a clear way of determining “officer” status as that distinct legal role is contemplated in corporate jurisprudence. Part I
discusses the three primary actors involved in the internal governance of the corporation—directors, stockholders, and officers—and
how the law defines each one. While corporate law clearly contemplates officers as a distinct role, a quick comparison of the three
reveals a failure to identify with any precision the bounds of “officer” status. Part II looks to other areas of the law for guidance in
defining and identifying the officers of the corporation. While the
policy considerations underlying the definitions of “officer” in each
of these other areas of the law may be similar or different to those
(“This chapter does not address how ‘officers’ should be defined.”) [https://perma.cc/BXB3XTDQ].
10. See Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81
BROOK. L. REV. 1637, 1638 (2016) (“[F]or the most part the innovations take the form of
private ordering—that is, the adoption of issuer-specific rules that are contractual in nature
(as opposed to statutes, agency rules, or decisional law).”); D. Gordon Smith et al., Private
Ordering with Shareholder Bylaws, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 n.12 (2011). This private
ordering can occur in a corporation’s governing documents or in separate contracts.
11. See Notice of Business Law Section Annual Meeting, Am. Bar Ass’n Dir. & Officer
Liab. Comm. (Sept. 10, 2018) (on file with author) (announcing and describing new Officer
Liability Task Force).
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animating “officer” for purposes of state corporate law, the articulation and identification of individuals occupying the officer role
are nevertheless instructive. Finally, Part III applies the lessons
learned from the struggles courts in securities law and bankruptcy
law have had in identifying officers and proposes a test for determining “officer” status. Adopting a prototype-centered approach,
the proposal rejects a fixed definition in lieu of a multi-factor approach that embodies the traditional and legal officer roles espoused by courts and scholars. The result stabilizes the meaning
of “officer” as a category of corporate actor and provides predictability and certainty to corporations, officers, directors, stockholders, third parties, and their counsel going forward.
I. CORPORATE ACTORS
As the Supreme Court observed in 1906, “A corporation is, after
all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name and
with a distinct legal entity.”12 That association can range from a
one-person, individually run enterprise to involving hundreds of
thousands of people.13 Regardless of size, state statutes contemplate three participants in the governance of the corporate endeavor (which positions can be held by the same or different persons)—directors, officers, and stockholders.14 These internal
participants are to be distinguished from what scholars and jurists
frequently refer to as “other constituencies” which can include employees, creditors, and customers, among others.15

12. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906), overruled in part by Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
13. See, e.g., Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 473, 474–75 (1953); Warner Fuller, The
Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1373, 1374–
75 (1938).
14. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 142, 151, 158; see also Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 645–46 (1982) (“The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle which
recognizes that only one State should have the authority to regulate a corporation’s internal
affairs—matters peculiar to the relationship among or between the corporation and its current officers, directors, and shareholders.”); JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS 5 (5th ed. 2000); COX & HAZEN, supra note 1, at 390 (describing the “traditional corporate pattern” as triangular and involving stockholders, directors, and officers);
WALTER A. EFFROSS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 4 (2d ed. 2013) (describing the “basic triad”
of a corporation—stockholders, directors, and officers—which reflects the ownership and
management structure of the corporation).
15. See EFFROSS, supra note 14, at 1.
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The internal participants in a corporation have a unique relationship shaped by the distinct rights and responsibilities vested
in each actor in governing the corporate enterprise. The traditional
pattern of corporate governance is structured in a hierarchical, triangular fashion.16 A small number of individuals sit atop the corporate triangle managing the business and affairs of the corporation.17 The largest number of participants, the stockholders, who
are the residual owners of the corporation, comprise the base of the
triangle and have limited governance rights.18 To protect against
self-interested, careless behavior by those at the top, while ensuring efficient management of the corporation, corporate law provides for a system of checks and balances.19 Each with their own
particular role to play in the corporate system of checks and balances, identification as a director, officer, or stockholder has significant implications for the legal authority, rights, responsibility,
and liability of an individual.20 Key topics in corporate law, such
as fiduciary duties, derivative litigation, director elections, exculpation, advancement and indemnification, reliance on experts and
16. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 1, at 390 (describing corporate governance as a triangle of participants); Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 196–
98 (2004); see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6–7 (The Macmillan Company 1932).
17. If one uses a statutory allocation of power lens through which to view the corporation the group at the top of the corporate governance triangle would be the board of directors. See § 141(a). On the other hand, when viewed from the perspective of actual day-today decision making at the corporation, executive officers would occupy the top position in
corporate governance. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 1, at 390 (stating that officers occupy
the top of the corporate governance decision-making pyramid).
18. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 1, at 390.
19. See Thompson, supra note 2, at 108–09 (“There are constraints on this broad power
given to directors, as most students of corporate law could recite. Shareholder voting is required, not just to elect directors, but also as a prerequisite to mergers and similar transactions after they have been proposed by directors. Shareholder voting can sometimes act to
cleanse conflicts of interest that exist for the directors. Fiduciary duty—perhaps the most
visible legal check on board power—is an after-the-fact judicial limit on the use of the power
given in the corporate statute.” (footnotes omitted)); Julian Velasco, The Fundamental
Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 442 (2006) (“Fiduciary duties and
shareholder approval requirements limit director autonomy, and the right to elect directors
is intended to keep directors accountable to the shareholders.”). For example, ultimate
power and authority for managing the business and affairs of the corporation is vested in
the board of directors. See § 141(a). A principal constraint on this expansive grant of authority are the fiduciary duties owed by directors in making decisions. Stockholder-initiated
lawsuits are the vehicle through which fiduciary duties are largely enforced. To protect
against abusive stockholder litigation, however, corporate law restricts derivative lawsuits
through the demand requirement provided for in Delaware Chancery Court Rule 23.1.
20. While directors and officers must be natural persons, stockholders need not. See §
141(b). For purposes of this Article, when stockholders are described as “individuals,” it is
intended to capture individual natural persons as well as individual entities that own stock
in a corporation.
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officers, bylaw amendments, internal affairs doctrine, and books
and records inspection rights all, to differing degrees, contemplate
the distinct roles these actors occupy in the corporation.21
A. Directors
Director (n): “A person appointed or elected to sit on a board
that manages the affairs of a corporation or other organization
. . . .”22
Corporate law situates the board of directors at the center of the
governance universe. Statutorily tasked with managing the business and affairs of the corporation—a charge that can only be delegated, never abdicated—director primacy is viewed by many as a
bedrock principle of corporate law.23 In light of the importance of
the board to a corporation’s livelihood, it is not surprising that
state statutes detail the procedures surrounding the structure and
composition of this decision-making body. Every board of directors
must have at least one director on its board, with the exact number
(which can be specific or a method for determining that number)
set forth in the governing documents.24 Directors need not be stockholders of the corporation they serve. State statutes merely require
that directors be natural persons.25 A corporation’s governing documents, federal securities laws, and stock exchange listing requirements may, however, prescribe other qualifications to be able
to serve on the board.26
21. See id. §§ 109, 141(e), 145, 211, 220; CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emp’s Pension Plan, 953
A.2d 227, 231 (Del. 2008) (addressing the interplay of stockholder power to amend the bylaws with the statutory grant of authority given to directors); VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 2005) (“The internal affairs doctrine
applies to those matters that pertain to the relationships among or between the corporation
and its officers, directors, and shareholders.”); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
22. Director, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
23. See § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed
by or under the direction of a board of directors.”); Gorman v. Salamone, No. 10183-VCN,
2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *14 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2015) (“Section 141(a) . . . establishes
‘the bedrock statutory principle of director primacy’ . . . .”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director
Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550 (2003);
see also McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 916 (Del. 2000).
24. See § 141(b) (“The board of directors of a corporation shall consist of 1 or more members . . . .”).
25. See id.; see also Friedman v. Dolan, C.A. No. 9425-VCN, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 178,
at *35 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (“The DGCL does not discuss minimum levels of attendance,
committee service, or professional experience.”).
26. For example, an entity’s organizational documents may impose stock ownership requirements (typically found in a close corporation), or independence requirements (typically

SHANER_JCI2 (DO NOT DELETE)

534

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

12/18/2019 2:50 PM

[Vol. 54:527

Identification of a corporation’s directors is theoretically a relatively straightforward task. Corporate statutes address the selection, resignation, removal, and terms of directors.27 Directors are
generally elected by the stockholders of the corporation on an annual basis.28 Where, however, there is a newly created directorship
or vacancy on the board, such opening can be filled by the stockholders or the board.29 In either scenario—election or appointment—a director holds his or her spot on the board until a successor is elected and qualified.30 In addition to the election and
qualification of a successor, corporate statutes recognize three
other scenarios under which the term of a director ends: death, resignation, and removal.31 A director is free to resign at any time
upon notice to the corporation.32 With respect to removal, only the
stockholders of the corporation may remove directors.33 Removal
found in a public corporation). See § 141(b) (“The certificate of incorporation or bylaws may
prescribe other qualifications for directors.”); Rule 5605 Board of Directors and Committees,
in The Nasdaq Stock Market Rules, NASDAQ (2019), http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/
NASDAQTools/bookmark.asp?id=nasdaq-rule_IM-5605&manual=/nasdaq/main/nasdaq-eq
uityrules/ [https://perma.cc/TF9Q-RFK8]; Section 303A.01 Independent Directors, in NYSE
Listed Company Manual, NYSE, https://nyseguide.srorules.com/listed-company-manual
(last updated Nov. 25, 2009) (defining and requiring a majority of “independent” directors
to serve on listed companies’ boards) [https://perma.cc/6AR8-UDZ4].
27. See § 141(b) (number of directors; providing for a minimum of one director); id. (the
only statutory criteria for directors is that they be a natural person); id. (resignation of
directors); § 141(d) (classified boards of directors); id. (directors designated by special classes or series of stock); § 141(k) (shareholder removal of directors); § 223 (filling vacancies on
the board); § 225(c) (judicial removal of directors). Some of the director statutes cited herein
are default provisions; thus, the process and procedures surrounding directors may be provided for in a combination of organizational documents (i.e., the corporate charter and bylaws) and the corporate statute.
Corporate statutes make clear the process and procedures regarding the selection and
tenure of directors; however, actual implementation of those processes and procedures at
any one corporation can result in uncertainty. But see Velasco, supra note 19, at 410 (“The
role of the director in the corporation is clearly defined.”).
28. See § 211 (providing for the annual meeting of stockholders for holding the election
of directors). A corporation’s certificate of incorporation may provide for a staggered board
of 1, 2 or 3 years, in which case only some (not all) of the directors are up for election in any
one year. Id. § 141(d) (providing for staggered boards).
29. See id. § 223(a).
30. See id. §§ 141(b), 223. In the case of a staggered board, Section 223 makes clear that
a director filling a vacancy or newly created directorship “shall hold office until the next
election of the class for which such directors shall have been chosen, and until their successors shall be elected and qualified.” Id. § 223(b).
31. See id. § 141(b), (k); Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 400 (Del.
2010) (stating that the Delaware General Corporation Law contains “procedural methods
by which the term of a sitting director can be brought to a close: first, where the director’s
successor is elected and qualified; second, if the director resigns; or third, if the director is
removed”).
32. See § 141(b).
33. See id. § 141(k). Directors may not remove fellow directors. See also BALOTTI &

SHANER_JCI2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

12/18/2019 2:50 PM

CORPORATE CHAMELEON

535

may be with or without cause, except in instances of cumulative
voting or classified boards.34
Clarity regarding the identity of the directors of the corporation
at any one point in time is of paramount importance. The board is
the backbone of the corporate enterprise, charged with ultimate
responsibility of managing the corporation’s business and affairs.35
Because directors must act as a collective body, a corporation can
become immobilized when controversy surrounds the validity of
just one individual’s director status.36 Accordingly, in addition to
setting forth the process and procedures surrounding director selection and removal, corporate statutes further provide an avenue
for expedient judicial relief where questions exist surrounding the
identity of the proper directors of an entity.37
B. Stockholders
Stockholder (n): “Someone who owns or holds a share or shares in
a company, esp. a corporation.”38
Corporate law describes stockholders as the owners of, and residual claimants to, the corporation.39 This is because stockholder
FINKELSTEIN, supra note 1, § 4.4.
34. See § 141(k).
35. See id. § 141(a); CLARK, supra note 8, at 22 (“The model behind corporate law’s
treatment of authority is one of a unilaterally controlled flow of authority from a single
wellspring of power [(the board)] rather than a bubbling up and flowing together of many
individual sources of personal power.”) (alteration in original); Thompson, supra note 2, at
108 (“The fulcrum of corporate governance for Delaware is clear: All corporate power is to
be exercised by or under the direction of the board of directors.”).
36. Directors are only authorized to act collectively, and not individually. CHARLES R.T.
O’KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 150
(8th ed. 2017) (“[D]irectors’ management power must be exercised collectively and by majority rule, and individual directors are not given general agency power to deal with outsiders.”).
37. See § 225(a); 2 EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW § 225.01 (6th ed. 2019). This includes resolving disputes arising from
director elections, appointments, resignations, and removals. See, e.g., § 225(a); Martin v.
Med-Dev Corp., C.A. No. 10525-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 272, at *35–50 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27,
2015) (addressing the validity of a director resignation); Hockessin Cmty. Ctr., Inc. v. Swift,
59 A.3d 437, 459–60 (Del. Ch. 2012) (addressing removal dispute). Further, “[t]he court also
has jurisdiction to determine the right of individuals to hold office even if such individuals
are not subject to the jurisdiction of the court.” WELCH ET AL., supra, § 225.01 (citing Grossman v. Liberty Leasing Co., 295 A.2d 749, 752 (Del. Ch. 1972)).
38. Stockholder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
39. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BUSINESS BASICS FOR LAW
STUDENTS 290, 294–95 (4th ed. 2006) (“The corporate model that appears in state incorporation statutes assumes that stockholders are the ultimate owners of the enterprise
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status is tied to ownership of shares of stock—common stock or
preferred stock—of the corporation. Shares represent a unit of interest in the corporation that entitles the holder to certain rights,
powers, and preferences vis-à-vis the corporation.40 Under statutory defaults, “there is no limit on the number of stockholders or
the number of shares that a corporation may issue. A corporation
may have thousands or even millions of stockholders.”41 Facebook
Inc., for example, reported in its Form 10-K for 2018 that as of December 31, 2018, it had 2.385 billion shares of Class A common
stock issued and outstanding and 469 million shares of Class B
common stock issued and outstanding, held by approximately 3780
stockholders of record and forty-one stockholders of record, respectively.42
Similar to directors, the law provides a means of definitively determining stockholder status. Corporate statutes prescribe in detail the procedures surrounding the creation, issuance, transfer,
. . . .”); O’KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 36, at 152 (“[T]he holders of those shares are the
corporation’s risk bearers and residual claimants.”).
40. The specific rights, powers, and preferences attached to any class or series of stock
must be set forth in the corporation’s certificate of incorporation. § 102(a)(4); see ALLEN ET
AL., supra note 2, at 118. “Under their share contract and by virtue of their status as owners
of shares, shareholders have three classes of rights against the corporation: (1) rights as to
control and management, (2) proprietary rights, and (3) remedial and ancillary rights.” COX
& HAZEN, supra note 1, at 718–19. As one prominent corporate casebook explains:
Corporate law everywhere provides that equity investors in the corporate entity legally own something distinct from any part of the corporation’s property:
They own a share interest. This share, or stock, is their personal legal property,
and generally . . . such a share may be transferred together with all rights that
it confers.
ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 99.
41. HAMILTON & BOOTH, supra note 39, at 290. While corporate statutes do not limit
the number of shares a corporation may issue, the charter does. See § 102(a)(4) (requiring
the charter to set forth the total number of shares a corporation is authorized to issue as
well as the specific allocation of those shares across different classes or series of stock).
Further, although state corporate statutes do not limit the number of shares any one person
or entity can own, such limits may be provided for in the entity’s governing documents,
private contracts such as stockholder agreements or federal regulations. See § 151(a) (stating that limitations, special rights or restrictions on stock shall be set forth in the certificate
of incorporation). Defensive devices and provisions such as poison pills and anti-takeover
statutes, while not limiting how many shares a stockholder can own, effectively do so
through penalties resulting from hitting certain ownership thresholds. See § 203 (restricting
“business combinations” with stockholders owning “15% or more of the outstanding voting
stock of the corporation”); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc. 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985)
(explaining how a rights plan, or “poison pill,” operates).
42. Facebook, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 31, 79 (Jan. 31, 2019). The 3780 stockholders of record for the Class A common stock is likely an underestimate, as the company
acknowledges that “[b]ecause many of our shares of Class A common stock are held by brokers and other institutions on behalf of stockholders, we are unable to estimate the total
number of stockholders represented by these record holders.” Id. at 31.

SHANER_JCI2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

12/18/2019 2:50 PM

CORPORATE CHAMELEON

537

repurchase, and record keeping for shares of stock.43 A corporation
must be able to easily identify its stockholders and is statutorily
required to maintain a “continuing record of stockholdings” including the names, addresses, and number of shares registered to each
stockholder of record as well as a ledger reflecting any transfers of
stock.44 This stock ledger then serves as “the only evidence as to
who are the stockholders entitled . . . to examine the list [of stockholders] or to vote . . . at any meeting of stockholders.”45
While stockholders generally have limited participatory rights
in managing the corporate enterprise, they are statutorily vested
with certain election and approval rights.46 Being able to determine with precision who is entitled to vote is thus imperative to
establish the validity of corporate decision making and actions. On
the front end, in addition to stock ledger requirements, state statutes set forth bright line rules for setting the record dates to determine who receives notices of meetings, who can vote at meetings,
and who can act by written consent.47 Inspectors are then appointed by a corporation to (1) determine the “number of shares
outstanding and the voting power of each,” (2) “[d]etermine the
shares represented at a [stockholders’] meeting and the validity of
proxies and ballots,” (3) “[c]ount all votes and ballots,” (4) determine and keep “record of the disposition of any challenges made to
any determination by the inspectors,” and (5) prepare a written
report and certify the foregoing determinations.48 Then on the back

43. See, e.g., § 102(a)(4) (capitalization structure must be in the certificate of incorporation); § 151 (classes and series of stock); § 152 (issuance of stock); § 158 (stock certificates);
§ 213 (record date); § 219 (list of stockholders); WELCH ET AL., supra note 37, § 213.01 (“A
corporation should be able readily to identify its stockholders from the corporation’s records.”) (citing In re Giant Portland Cement Co., 21 A.2d 697, 701 (Del. Ch. 1941)).
44. §§ 219, 220 (2019); see also Funkhouser v. Fusion Sys. Corp., C.A. No. 12895 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 17, 1993) (oral ruling); Magill v. N. Am. Refractories Co., 128 A.2d 233, 236–37
(Del. 1956); In re Giant Portland Cement Co., 21 A.2d at 701; WELCH ET AL., supra note 37,
§ 219.03 (“It is implicit in sections 219 and 220 that Delaware corporations have an affirmative duty to maintain a stock ledger.”).
45. § 219(c) (2019).
46. See Velasco, supra note 19, at 430–31 (“Shareholder voice is limited to a few instances explicitly authorized by statute.”); see, e.g., § 211 (election of directors); § 242 (approval of amendments to the certificate of incorporation); § 251 (approval of mergers); § 271
(approval of sales of all or substantially all of a corporation’s assets).
47. See § 213. State statutes also provide for record date setting with respect to dividends and distributions. Id.
48. Id. § 231(a)–(b).
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end, statutes such as Section 225 of the Delaware General Corporation Law provide the courts with the power to review and determine the validity of any stockholder vote or written consent.49
C. Officers
Officer (n): “Someone who holds an office of trust, authority, or
command. . . . In corporate law, the term refers esp. to a person
elected or appointed by the board of directors to manage the daily
operations of a corporation, such as a CEO, president, secretary, or
treasurer.”50
While as a formal legal matter the board is the focal point of
corporate power, its actual role in corporate decision making is
much more modest. It is officers that largely shoulder the decisionmaking duties.51 The discrepancy between the allocation of formal
legal authority to the board and actual exercise of authority by officers is particularly evident in public corporations.52 As is consistently noted in the literature and cases: “Today, directors in the
modern public corporation select senior officers ‘and then step

49. See id. § 225(a) (addressing the review of the election or removal of directors and
officers); § 225 (b) (addressing the review of any vote of stockholders on all matters other
than the election of directors).
50. Officer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
51. See JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A2d 335, 340 (Del. Ch.
2008) (stating that “[officers] have the far more onerous task of operating the company each
day”); BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 1, § 4.10[A], [C]; Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell,
Executive Compensation and the Optimal Penumbra of Delaware Corporate Law, 4 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 333, 343 (2009); Ribstein, supra note 16, at 188 (“[T]he corporate form of centralized management involves dividing management between professional full-time executives
who manage the firm day-to-day and directors who oversee the board and set policy.”); see
also CLARK, supra note 8, at 105–06. Section 3.01 of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance explicitly recognizes this delegation and reference principal senior executives
alongside the board as having management authority. See PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, § 3.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2019) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]; id. at cmt. a (stating that “[section] 3.01 reflects long-established corporate practice” that it is the officers and
not the board that operate the business of the corporation).
52. See Grimes v. Donald, No. CIV.A. 13358, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 3, at *25–26 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 11, 1995) (“Of course, given the large, complex organizations through which modern, multi-function business corporations often operate, the law recognizes that corporate
boards, comprised as they traditionally have been of persons dedicating less than all of their
attention to that role, cannot themselves manage the operations of the firm, but may satisfy
their obligations by thoughtfully appointing officers, establishing or approving goals and
plans and monitoring performance.” (citations omitted)), aff’d, 673 A.2d 1207 (Del. 1996);
see also CLARK, supra note 8, at 105–06; MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY
41, 58, 70, 73, 76, 191 (1971); Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality—Ten Years Later,
32 RUTGERS L. REV. 293, 294–97 (1979).
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aside, intervening only in times of crisis, or on very large issues
such as a merger or major refinancing.’”53
In comparison to directors and stockholders, corporate statutes
and case law provide limited guidance surrounding officers.54 Corporate statutes merely specify that officers are to be elected by the
board of directors unless otherwise provided in the corporation’s
governing documents.55 Historically, corporate statutes also articulated the traditional officer roles to be occupied within the corporation. Chief executive officer, president, vice president, treasurer,
and secretary were officer positions typically cited in statutes.56 As
modern corporation law became more enabling, the specific statutory nomenclature regarding officers disappeared in favor of more
general permissive language.57 Today, corporations have considerable freedom to designate officers with whatever titles and duties
they choose.58 As a prominent treatise on corporate law advises: “A

53. Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Stockholder Litigation, Fiduciary Duties, and the Officer Dilemma, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
334 (Sean Griffith et al. eds. 2018) (quoting Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus To Join Your Board), 28
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 18 (2003)). But see Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88
TEX. L. REV. 987 (2010) (describing the decline in executive power).
54. See DeMott, supra note 2, at 848 (discussing how officers have been overlooked in
corporate law discussions and literature); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling
Why Corporate Officers Are Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1617 (2005); Stephen
P. Lamb & Joseph Christensen, Duty Follows Function: Two Approaches to Curing the Mismatch Between the Fiduciary Duties and Potential Personal Liability of Corporate Officers,
26 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 45, 46–47 (2012); Shaner, supra note 9; Megan
W. Shaner, The (Un)Enforcement of Corporate Officers’ Duties, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 271
(2014); Johnson, supra note 9, at 6.
55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.40(a) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2016) (“A corporation has the officers described in its bylaws or appointed by the board
of directors in accordance with the bylaws.”); see also Gorman v. Salamone, No. 10183-VCN,
2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *11 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2015) (holding that the board of directors,
and not the stockholders, has the authority to remove and replace officers).
56. See, e.g., § 142(a) (1967) (requiring a corporation to have “a president, secretary,
and treasurer”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 50 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969).
57. See § 142 (2019) (“Every corporation organized under this chapter shall have such
officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the
board of directors which is not inconsistent with the bylaws . . . .”); COX & HAZEN, supra
note 1, at 335. Under Delaware law, the only positive limitations on selecting officers are
that a corporation must have (1) an officer with the authority to sign instruments to be filed
with the Secretary of State and stock certificates, and (2) an officer who has the duty to
record stockholders’ meetings and directors’ meetings. §§ 142(a), 158.
58. See WELCH ET AL., supra note 37, § 142.02, 4-354.1 n.5 (“Professor Folk commented
in the first edition of this treatise that the result of the 1970 amendment was to give a
corporation freedom to designate its executives by whatever names it wishes and to allocate
the managerial power delegated to executives.”) (citing ERNEST L. FOLK, III, THE DELAWARE
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 142 cmt. 2 (1st ed. 1972)).
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corporation need not have a president or a vice president or a secretary or a treasurer, as such; it could have a ‘czar’ or a ‘potentate’
and a ‘recordkeeper.’”59 While these specific titles have not come
into vogue, corporate America has seen some creative variations
on the traditional officer titles. For example, Stonyfield Farm CEO
Gary Hirshberg’s official title was “CE-Yo,” Steve Jobs’s official title at Apple was “iCEO,” Twitter CFO Adam Bain was the corporation’s “President of Revenue,” and even more unconventional,
the CEO’s title at SCVNGR, Inc. is “Chief Ninja.”60 While a bit extreme, these examples illustrate that identification of corporate officers is not always a straightforward task.
At the other end of the spectrum, individuals working at a corporation may be given officer-like titles when in substance their
role is more akin to a rank-and-file employee. “A larger corporation
may have a number of vice presidents, assistant vice presidents,
assistant secretaries, assistant treasurers, and so on . . . . As the
number of vice presidents in corporations has proliferated, super
vice presidencies under such titles as ‘executive vice president’ or
‘senior vice president’ have been created . . . .”61 In the context of
short-swing liability under federal securities laws, for example, the
courts frequently point out the practice of giving individuals honorary officer titles with no commensurate responsibility or authority.62 Given the flexibility afforded to corporations in fashioning
corporate offices and titles, officers are not fungible across corporations in the same way as directors.63

59. BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 1, § 4.10[C].
60. Alyson Shontell, 13 Completely Ridiculous Tech Executive Titles, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Sept. 13, 2010, 12:10 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/completely-ridiculous-ceo-tit
les-2010-9 [https://perma.cc/GNS3-RCXJ].
61. COX & HAZEN, supra note 1, at 121.
62. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Livingston, 566 F.2d 1119,
1122 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding that despite title, the individual lacked any power of an actual
executive officer); Rosenbloom v. Adams, Scott & Conway, Inc., 552 F.2d 1336, 1338–39 (9th
Cir. 1977) (finding the plaintiff’s corporate title to be hollow).
63. The selection, removal, term, and duties of directors are relatively standardized
across all corporations given the statutory framework within which these actors exist. The
role of “officer,” on the other hand, is not statutorily structured to the same degree. Moreover, state and federal law have eliminated the ability to create figurehead or “dummy” directors. See In re Puda Coal Inc. Stockholders Litigation, No. 6476-CS, transcript of bench
ruling issued (Del. Ch. Feb. 19, 2013). As explained by one well-known treatise:
The rationale for not permitting director titles and position without concomitant obligations is that there is a “holding out” and thus justifies imposition of
fiduciary obligations. The same may not be true of honorary or purely titular
officers. Unlike figure-head directors, merely making someone a vice president
may not confer any authority nor impose any special fiduciary obligation.
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Further complicating the matter is that the number of officers a
corporation may employ has no limits. With respect to directors,
state statutes make clear that the corporation’s governing documents shall define the range, if not the exact number, of directors
that can serve on the board.64 No such analogous requirement exists for officers. And it would be the rare charter or bylaws that set
forth a range or exact number of officers for the corporation. More
often, bylaws provide for a few specific offices and then include
broad authorizing language empowering the board to create such
offices and appoint such other officers as the board may, in its discretion, deem necessary.65 The lack of boundaries on the number
of individuals that can serve as an officer coupled with the wide
discretion in the titling of those individuals, means the potential
for (and actual) abstruseness in identifying who occupies the officer role, as that role is contemplated in corporate jurisprudence,
is great.
In sum, state corporate statutes and case law, as well as the internal governance documents of corporations, fail to provide a clear
means for determining “officer” status. The next section summarizes efforts to define the role of corporate “officer” in other areas
of the law. As quickly becomes clear in reviewing these definitions,
there is no cohesive delineation of “officer” status; rather, the legal
meaning of officer is relatively fluid.
II. COMPETING DEFINITIONS
As previously discussed, there is a dearth of corporate case law
or statutes defining “officer.” Identification of corporate officers
has, however, implications beyond state corporate law. Securities
laws, bankruptcy laws, jurisdictional statutes, and others specifically take into account the corporate “officer” position in their rules
5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 13.24 (6th ed.
2009).
64. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(b) (“The number of directors shall be fixed by, or
in the manner provided in, the bylaws, unless the certificate of incorporation fixes the number of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.03 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“A board of
directors shall consist of one or more individuals, with the number specified in or fixed in
accordance with the articles of incorporation or bylaws.”).
65. See, e.g., BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 1, at art. IV (“The officers of the corporation shall consist of . . . such other officers as the Board of Directors may from time to
time determine, each of whom shall be elected by the Board of Directors . . . .”); see also
O’Hare supra note 2, at 566 (reviewing public company bylaws and finding only boilerplate
language).
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and regulations. The following sections describe how these other
areas of the law attempt to identify the officers of the corporation.
While the policy considerations underlying the definitions of “officer” in each of these other areas of the law may be similar or different to those animating “officer” for purposes of corporate law,
the articulation and identification of individuals occupying the officer role are nevertheless instructive. In fashioning its own definition, state corporate law can learn from the struggles legislators,
courts, and parties have faced in trying to discern who is and is not
an officer of the corporation.
A. Securities Law
Federal securities laws make reference to the “officers” of a corporation in several different contexts, imposing disclosure requirements, certification requirements, and other obligations on individuals occupying this role. The definition of “officer” for purposes
of the rules promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of
1933 (“the 1933 Exchange Act”) and the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 (“the 1934 Exchange Act”) is set forth in Rule 3b-2 and
Rule 405, respectively: “The term officer means a president, vice
president, secretary, treasury or principal financial officer, comptroller or principal accounting officer, and any person routinely
performing corresponding functions with respect to any organization whether incorporated or unincorporated.”66 Rule 3b-7 further
defines “executive officers” as “president, any vice president of the
registrant in charge of a principal business unit, division or function (such as sales, administration or finance), any other officer
who performs a policy making function or any other person who
performs similar policy making functions for the registrant.”67
These definitions of officer and executive officer are relevant for
obligations under the 1933 Exchange Act and 1934 Exchange Act
such as disclosure of compensation and bonuses, disclosure of loans
exceeding certain thresholds, certification of certain filings, whistleblower provisions, and disclosure of hedging practices.68

66. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-2 (2019); see § 230.405 (Rule 405 containing the same general
definition of “officer” for purposes of the 1933 Act).
67. § 240.3b-7; see § 230.501(f) (the definitional section for “executive officer” relating
to unregistered sales made pursuant to Regulation D).
68. See Disclosure of Hedging by Employees, Officers, and Directors, 84 Fed. Reg. 2402,
2402–03, 2425–26 (Feb. 6, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240); Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 787 § 402, amending section 13 of the 1934 Act,
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Following the stock market crash of 1929, Congress enacted Section 16 of the 1934 Exchange Act to address, among other things,
insider trading and short-swing profits.69 The reporting and automatic liability provisions in Section 16 apply only to directors, officers, and beneficial owners of more than ten percent of any class
of equity security of an issuer corporation.70 Originally, the definition of “officer” in Section 16 was quite broad: “a president, vicepresident, treasurer, secretary, comptroller, and any other person
who performs for an issuer, whether incorporated or unincorporated, functions corresponding to those performed by the foregoing
officers.”71
Despite a facially straightforward definition, early cases applying Section 16 to alleged officers disagreed as to the proper interpretation and application of that term.72 In analyzing transactions
covered by Section 16, courts adopted three different approaches
to determining who is an officer. The first test uses an objective
approach, focusing solely on the title of the individual at issue.73
The mere status of an individual triggers application of the statute.
On the other end of the spectrum, some courts applied a subjective
approach, looking beyond an individual’s title to his or her job duties, access to information, authority to influence corporate affairs,
and decision making.74 These courts reason that a more functional

15 U.S.C.A. § 78m (prohibiting loans to executive officers); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 787 § 403 (requiring the CEO and CFO to certify financial statements).
69. See Brad B. Erens, New Section 503(c) of the Bankruptcy Code—Who Is an “Officer”
Under the KERP Amendment?, 21 No.7 ANDREWS CORP. OFFICERS & DIRECTORS LIAB. LITIG.
REPORTER 14, at *3–4 (2005). In addition, section 16(a)’s notice of stock ownership requirements by corporate insiders like “officers” alerts investors to insiders engaging in transactions involving shares of the corporation. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(a), 15
U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2012); 4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 13.1[1]–[2] (5th ed. 2005).
70. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2012); see also THOMAS
LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 530 (6th ed. 2009).
71. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Rathman, 106 F. Supp. 810, 812 (S.D. Cal. 1952).
72. See HAZEN, supra note 70, at 531; David E. Gardels, Section 16(b) of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934: Is a Vice President an Officer, 58 NEB. L. REV. 733 (1979) (discussing case law addressing the definition of “officer” under Section 16(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act); A. John Murphy, Who Is an Officer Under Section 16(b)—Who Knows, 12 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 378, 378 (1975) (exploring the “spreading confusion and tests that are proliferating from the federal courts in their quest to resolve the dilemma of ‘who is an officer?’
under Section 16(b) . . . .”).
73. See, e.g., Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959); Ferraiolo v. Newman,
259 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958).
74. See, e.g., C.R.A. Realty Corp. v. Crotty, 878 F.2d 562, 566–67 (2d Cir. 1989); Colby
v. Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873 (2d Cir. 1949).
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analysis for determining “officer” status furthers the purpose and
goals of the statute.75 Drawing from both the objective and subjective approaches arose the “title-with-exception” analysis which
provides that an individual’s title creates a presumption of “officer”
status, which can be rebutted upon a showing that functionally the
individual was not in a position to influence corporate decision
making or have access to confidential information.76
Later revisions to the rules promulgated under Section 16 are
viewed as having put to rest at least some, if not all, of the uncertainty in determining who qualifies as an officer that arose from
the competing approaches applied by the courts.77 Additionally,
Section 16’s “officer” definition was revised and narrowed in Rule
16a-1(f) so that Section 16 would apply to “executive officers” and
not “officers” more broadly.78 Rule 16a-1(f) provides that
[t]he term “officer” shall mean an issuer’s president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer (or, if there is no such accounting officer, the controller), any vice-president of the issuer in charge
of a principal business unit, division or function (such as sales, administration or finance), any other officer who performs a policy-making
function, or any other person who performs similar policy-making
functions for the issuer.79

These revisions were intended to clarify that Section 16’s responsibilities and liabilities are not applicable to those individuals who
are an officer in title only, thereby rejecting the objective-only approach applied by some courts.80 The revisions and the SEC’s guid-

75. See C.R.A. Realty Corp., 878 F.2d at 566–67 (reasoning that a functional test would
best serve the congressional purpose in enacting Section 16).
76. See, e.g., Winston v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 853 F.2d 455, 457–58 (6th Cir. 1988); Nat’l
Med. Enters., Inc. v. Small, 680 F.2d 83, 84 (9th Cir. 1982).
77. See HAZEN, supra note 70, at 531.
78. See Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders, 53 Fed. Reg. 49,997, 50,000 (Dec. 13, 1988 (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240)). In defining
“officer” more narrowly for purposes of Section 16 only, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) stated that “of particular concern is the inclusion of all vice presidents in
the definition [of “officer”] and that “[m]any businesses give the title of vice president to
employees who do not have significant managerial or policymaking duties and are not privy
to inside information.” Id. at 50,000; see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Livingston, 566 F.2d 1119, 1121–22 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding that a corporation had 350 “executive vice presidents”).
79. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f) (2018). The revised definition of “officer” only applies to
Section 16 and the rules promulgated thereunder. See § 240.16a-1 (“Terms defined in this
rule shall apply solely to section 16 of the Act and the rules thereunder.”).
80. See HAZEN, supra note 70, at 531. The SEC has stated that section 16 was “intended
to apply to those officers who have routine access to material non-public information, not
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ance related thereto indicate that a subjective analysis is necessary in determining “officer” status, however, the degree to which
function versus title should be considered by the courts is not entirely clear.
In sum, courts applying federal securities laws have struggled
with the relative weight given to an individual’s title versus what
role their functions should play in determining whether an individual is an “officer” as contemplated in the statute and rules
promulgated thereunder. Even where statutes and regulations,
such as Section 16 and Rule 16a-1(f), appear to articulate a clear
definition for “officer,” ambiguity with respect to the exact ambit
of that definition exists.
B. Bankruptcy Law
When a corporation is a debtor in bankruptcy, federal bankruptcy law imposes additional scrutiny on the review and approval
of transactions, fees, and claims involving “insiders” of the entity.
For example, included in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 were amendments to the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code that placed stringent limits on the ability of a
court to approve “key employee retention plans” (KERPs) and severance payments to insiders in corporate reorganizations.81 Another example is Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code (“Section
547”), which imposes a longer preferential payment reach-back period to negate transfers of debtor property made to insiders—a oneyear preference period for insiders as opposed to a ninety-day preference period for all others.82
An “insider” as defined in the Bankruptcy Code includes, among
others, the directors and officers of a debtor corporation.83 “Officer”
is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code and there has been limited
case law interpreting the term.84 In those instances where bankruptcy courts have had to determine “officer” status, they generally
those with particular titles.” Ownership Reports and Trading by Officers, Directors and
Principal Stockholders, 53 Fed. Reg. 49,997, 50,000 (proposed Dec. 13, 1988) (to be codified
at C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249, 270, 274).
81. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-8, § 331, 119 Stat. 23, 102 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 503(c) (2012)).
82. § 547.
83. § 101(31)(B).
84. See In re Glob. Aviation Holdings Inc., 478 B.R. 142, 147 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(citing In re Borders Grp. Inc., 453 B.R. 459, 468 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)); Erens, supra note
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cite to the dictionary definition of “officer.”85 The majority of courts
have also made clear, however, that the presence or absence of traditional officer titles or words is not dispositive in determining “officer” status under the Code.86 The courts instead have applied a
case-by-case, functional approach taking into account an individual’s involvement in the affairs of the corporation and authority
over critical financial decisions, dictating policy, and/or the disposition of assets.87
One important takeaway from the cases interpreting “officer” is
that the exact boundaries of “officer” status appear to shift depending on the particular section of the Bankruptcy Code at issue.
Courts look to the particular purpose or policy underlying a statutory section in crafting its interpretation of “officer” and concluding
whether an individual falls under that category.88 For example, in
the context of Section 547—the preferential payment reach-back—

69, at *1; Paul R. Hage & Partick R. Mohan, Recent Developments in Section 503—Administrative Expenses & Key Employee Retention, Incentive and Severance Plans, in NORTON
ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 779, 823 (2013 ed.).
85. See In re Glob. Aviation, 478 B.R. at 147–48 (stating that “officer” is defined as a
“person elected or appointed by the board of directors to manage the daily operations of a
corporation”) (internal quotation marks omitted); In re Foothills Tex., Inc., 408 B.R. 573,
579 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (stating that “in considering a statute the Court starts with its
plain meaning” and then looking to dictionary definitions of “officer”); cf. In re Borders Grp.
Inc., 453 B.R. at 468 (citing the dictionary definition of “officer”).
86. See In re Glob. Aviation, 478 B.R. at 148; In re Foothills Tex., Inc., 408 B.R. at 579
(“[T]he mere title of a person does not end the inquiry.”); Office of U.S. Tr. v. Fieldstone
Mortg. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91479, at *8 (D. Md. 2008) (lower court stating that “the
Court is not precluded by the terminology that I used from taking evidence from behind the
titles that people hold in any given situation”). But see id. at *18–20 (reversing the bankruptcy court and holding that the important inquiry is whether the individual was appointed or elected by the board). In NMI Sys., Inc. v. Pillard (In re NMI Sys., Inc.), for example, the court held that a vice president was not an officer for the purposes of the “insider”
definition because his title was conferred for marketing purposes only. 179 B.R. 357, 370
(Bankr. D.D.C. 1995).
87. See In re Glob. Aviation, 478 B.R. at 148; In re Borders Grp. Inc., 453 B.R. at 469;
Fieldstone Mortg. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91479, at *8 (“[T]he question is whether they
are officers in the traditional sense, in the sense that they are making decisions, they’re
acting on behalf of the corporation, they are in charge, they are insiders.”) (alteration in
original); In re 9281 Shore Rd. Owners Corp., 187 B.R. 837, 853 (E.D.N.Y 1995). But see
Fieldstone Mortg. Co., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91479, at *1–4 (“Insofar as the bankruptcy court
understood the definition of ‘officer’ to require additional ‘traditional’ elements, like major
decision-making, it expanded the term beyond its ordinary legal meaning.”).
88. See, e.g., In re NMI Sys. Inc., 179 B.R. at 369–70; see C.R.A. Realty Corp. v. Crotty,
878 F.2d 562, 566–67 (2d Cir. 1989) (concluding that the test for “officer” status for purposes
of Section 16(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act was whether the individual had access to confidential information that would allow the individual to engage in the actions the section
sought to prohibit). But see In re Foothills Tex., Inc., 408 B.R. at 583 (disagreeing “that the
meaning of ‘officer’ should vary according to the context in which the word is used”).
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the courts have focused on the individual’s ability to dictate financial decisions and have access to sensitive financial information in
determining “officer” status.89 In support of its attention to financial controls, the courts reference the policy and purpose underlying Section 547—the prevention of insiders with access to nonpublic financial information influencing the disposition of assets to
their benefit and the detriment of the non-insider creditors.90 In
contrast, KERP challenges under Section 503—which are primarily concerned with the prevention of self-interested executive compensation—elicit a broader functional assessment by the courts
where an individual’s more general responsibilities and authority
to influence corporate decision-making (not just financial decisions) are taken into account for determining “officer” status.91 Yet
nowhere in the Bankruptcy Code is there an indication that “officer” is intended to have this type of definitional fluidity across
provisions. Rather, it is a product of the lack of clarity in defining
“officer” not only in bankruptcy law, but across disciplines.92
C. Jurisdictional Statutes
In 2004, the Delaware legislature amended its implied consent
statute to include certain officers of Delaware corporations. Specifically, Section 3114(b) of the Delaware Code provides that individuals who accept election or appointment as an officer (or serve in
such capacity) are deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction in the state of Delaware.93 For purposes of the statute, “officer”
is defined as one who:

89. See, e.g., In re NMI Sys. Inc., 179 B.R. at 370 (applying the Bankruptcy Code’s preference statute and tying “officer” status to whether an individual “was . . . in the inner circle
making the company’s critical financial decisions”).
90. See id. at 368–69 (distinguishing “officer” status under securities laws from bankruptcy laws in that the policies behind the statutes are different and stating that “the employee’s functions and status, viewed relative to the statute’s goals in using the term ‘officer,’
ought to control whether the person is an officer”); In re Erin Food Svcs., Inc., 980 F.2d 792,
796 (1st Cir. 1992).
91. See, e.g., In re Glob. Aviation, 478 B.R. at 148.
92. See In re NMI Sys. Inc., 179 B.R. at 368 (noting the lack of case law addressing the
meaning of the term “officer”); see also Erens, supra note 69, at *2–4.
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114(b); see also Eric A. Chiappinelli, Jurisdiction over
Directors and Officers in Delaware, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 316, 319 (Sean Griffith et al. eds., 2018); Eric A. Chiappinelli,
The Underappreciated Importance of Personal Jurisdiction in Delaware’s Success, 63
DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 944 (2014); Winship, supra note 3 (discussing Delaware’s implied consent statutes).
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(1) Is or was the president, chief executive officer, chief operating officer, chief financial officer, chief legal officer, controller, treasurer or
chief accounting officer of the corporation at any time during the
course of conduct alleged in the action or proceeding to be wrongful;
(2) Is or was identified in the corporation’s public filings with the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission because such person is or was [one] of the most highly compensated executive officers
of the corporation at any time during the course of conduct alleged in
the action or proceeding to be wrongful; or
(3) Has, by written agreement with the corporation, consented to be
identified as an officer for purposes of this section.94

In defining “officer,” the statute takes a more formulaic approach,
focusing on the titles of individuals within the corporate enterprise
in part (b)(1), and the identification as a highly compensated executive officer for purposes of certain federal securities regulations
reporting requirements in (b)(2). Interestingly, while the Delaware
General Corporation Law has moved to eliminating any specific
titles in its provisions, the jurisdictional statute that applies to corporate participants includes them. Further, in contrast to bankruptcy law and other federal securities regulations, Delaware’s jurisdictional statute lacks a catch-all provision in the definition of
“officer” to pick up individuals who are functional equivalents of
those titled offices, instead relying on compensation levels to serve
as a proxy for “officer” status.
D. ALI Principles
The American Law Institute (“ALI”) is an independent organization founded in 1923 for the purpose of bringing clarity to different areas of the law through the articulation of basic legal principles, while also providing constructive assessments of the law and
recommendations on what the law should be.95 To that end, the
ALI promulgates Restatements of the Law, Model Codes, and Principles of Law.96 In 1994, the ALI published a study and set of recommendations in the area of corporate governance (the ALI Principles). A stated purpose of the project was “to clarify the duties
and obligations of corporate directors and officers and to provide
guidelines for discharging those responsibilities in an efficient

94. § 3114(b).
95. See About ALI, A.L.I., https://www.ali.org/about-ali/ [https://perma.cc/D395TAWL].
96. Id.
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manner, with minimum risks of personal liability.”97 Based in part
on federal securities rules and regulations, the ALI Principles define “officer” as:
(a) the chief executive, operating, financial, legal, and accounting officers of a corporation;
(b) to the extent not encompassed by the foregoing, the chairman of
the board of directors (unless the chairman neither performs a policymaking function other than as a director nor receives a material
amount of compensation in excess of director’s fees), president, treasurer, and secretary, and a vice-president or vice-chairman who is in
charge of a principal business unit, division, or function (such as sales,
administration, or finance) or performs a major policymaking function
for the corporation; and
(c) any other individual designated by the corporation as an officer.98

The ALI incorporates both function and labels in its definition. In
Subsection (a), “officer” status arises out of a combination of the
duties an individual performs as well as their status within the
corporation (i.e., “chief”).99 Subsection (b) then shifts to looking at
the title of an individual while still preserving functional space
with the catch-all category of “performs a major policymaking function for the corporation” as a whole.100 Finally, Subsection (c) captures purely the corporation’s labeling of its participants as “officers” of the enterprise without reference to duties or function.101
Similar to the approach adopted by federal securities laws, the
ALI tiers the legal consequences of “officer” status based on which
part of the definition—(a), (b), or (c)—the individual satisfies.102
For example, the sections of the ALI Principles addressing the duty
of care and the business judgement rule apply to all individuals
falling under Section 1.27’s “officer” definition.103 In contrast, only

97. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 51, President’s Foreword at XI, XXI.
98. Id. § 1.27; see id. at cmt. a (“Subsections (a) and (b) are derived in part from Rule
16a-1(f) under the Securities Exchange Act, Rule 405 under the Securities Act, and Federal
Securities Code § 202(112).”).
99. Id. § 1.27 cmt. b (“The term ‘chief’ in Subsection (a) modifies each of the functions
in that subsection. If, as sometimes occurs, the corporation designates more than one individual to hold an office encompassed within Subsection (a) (e.g., a two- or three-person office
of the chief executive), all the individuals so designated should fall within that Subsection.”).
100. See id. § 1.27(b). Subsection (b) is narrower than the definition of “executive officer”
of Rule 3b-7 of the Securities Exchange Act, upon which it is based. See id. § 1.27 cmt. c.
101. See id. § 1.27(c).
102. See id. § 1.27 cmt. d.
103. See id. § 4.01 (“A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the
director’s or officer’s functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent
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individuals who qualify as “officer[s]” under Subsections (a) or (b)
are considered “senior executive[s]” and are subject to provisions
like disclosure of corporate opportunities.104 Finally, individuals
who are “chief” officers under Subsection (a) are further defined as
“principal senior executives”105 and in that capacity have additional rights and obligations in managing the corporate enterprise.106
III. DEFINING “OFFICER” IN STATE CORPORATE LAW
The American legal system generally operates through a system
of categories and consequences.107 Corporate law is no different.
State corporate law depicts directors, officers, and stockholders
each as distinct categories of actors within the operations and governance of the corporation.108 And membership in each of these categories carries with it distinct legal duties, rights, and liabilities.
While consequences are important, it is largely categorization
that drives legal analysis and rulemaking.109 Corporate law clearly
envisions a distinct “officer” category,110 but it fails to articulate
that role with any certainty, leaving it up to corporations to do so
in their governing documents. To date, however, corporations fail
person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances. This Subsection (a) is subject to the provisions of Subsection (c) (the business
judgment rule) where applicable.”).
104. See id. § 1.33 (“‘Senior executive’ means an officer described in Subsection (a) or (b)
of § 1.27 (Officer).”); see also id. § 5.02 (Transactions with the Corporation).
105. See id. § 1.30 (“‘Principal senior executive’ means an officer described in Subsection
(a) of § 1.27 (Officer).”).
106. See, e.g., id. § 3.01 (Management of the Corporation’s Business: Functions and Powers of Principal Senior Executives and Other Officers); § 5.15 (Transfer of Control in Which
a Director or Principal Senior Executive Is Interested).
107. Kristin E. Hickman & Claire A. Hill, Concepts, Categories, and Compliance in the
Regulatory State, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1151, 1158–59 (2010) (“Laws attach consequences to
particular categories of behavior.”).
108. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (identifying the directors, officers, agents and
employees of a corporation).
109. See Hickman & Hill, supra note 107, at 1185; cf. Kari Hong, The Absurdity of CrimeBased Deportation, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2067, 2074 (2017) (describing how the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 attaches deportation consequences based on categories of crimes committed by non-citizens).
110. See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1257 (2008); R. Franklin Balotti & Megan W. Shaner, Safe Harbor for
Officer Reliance: Comparing the Approaches of the Model Business Corporation Act and Delaware’s General Corporation Law, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161 (2011); Johnson & Millon, supra note 54, at 1617; Lamb & Christensen, supra note 54, at 46; Shaner, supra note
53; Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Restoring the Balance of Power in Corporate Management:
Enforcing an Officer’s Duty of Obedience, 66 BUS. LAW. 277 (2010).
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to provide any meaningful specificity in this regard.111 Moreover,
courts and scholars have focused their efforts on expounding the
legal consequences of “officer” status largely to the exclusion of the
categorization issue.112 As discussed in more detail infra, courts
have made clear that there is a formal distinction in corporate law
(1) between officers and directors, and (2) between officers and employees or agents.113 The officer-director and officer-agent divides
trigger significant legal consequences vis-à-vis the individual officer, the corporation, and third parties; however, where those demarcations are, exactly, is left to speculation.
A. Officers Versus Directors
Officers are frequently grouped together with directors in discussions of corporate governance and described collectively as “corporate management.”114 Yet the officer clearly occupies its own discrete role in the corporate form.115 Legally and practically
speaking, there is a formal distinction between the two types of
corporate managers. Officers are selected by and serve at the
pleasure of the board of directors.116 Further, officers, unlike the
board, have no inherent authority to act on behalf of the corporation, rather they acquire it via delegation from the board or in the
bylaws.117 Consequently, the typical division of managerial responsibilities within a corporation is (1) the board is tasked with setting
111. See O’Hare, supra note 2, at 566 (finding only boilerplate language regarding officers in a review of public company bylaws).
112. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 9, at 5 n.9 (“This chapter does not address how ‘officers’ should be defined.”); O’Hare, supra note 2, at 563 (pointing out the issue but focusing
on officer disclosure obligations instead); Shaner, supra note 9, at 359 n.3 (focusing primarily on senior/executive officers when discussing “officers” under corporate law). But see DeMott, supra note 2, at 848 (exploring the implications of the definitional fluidity surrounding “officer” and answering the question using agency law).
113. See § 141(e) (referencing officers and employees separately); § 145 (delineating between directors, officers, employees, and agents for purposes of indemnification and advancement).
114. See, e.g., Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 110, at 1262–65, 1307 (discussing officer
and director fiduciary duties in the same manner); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & Robert V. Ricca,
(Not) Advising Corporate Officers About Fiduciary Duties, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663,
665 (2007) (finding a disparity in the advice that corporate lawyers provide to directors and
officers regarding fiduciary duties).
115. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 110, at 1262–63; Johnson & Millon, supra note
54, at 1617; Shaner, supra note 110; Lamb & Christensen, supra note 54, at 62.
116. See, e.g., § 142; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.40 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); Gorman v.
Salamone, No. 10183-VCN, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *16–19 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2015)
(holding that the board has the authority to hire and fire officers of the corporation).
117. See § 142; WELCH ET AL., supra note 37, at 4-358 (“Professor Folk commented in the
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corporate policy and approving corporate acts, and (2) the officers
are charged with implementing those policies and managing the
day-to-day business and affairs.118 Regardless of the specific allocation of managerial functions, at all times the board remains the
ultimate authority within the corporation and therefore must monitor the corporate enterprise, including officers.119
B. Officers Versus Employees or Agents
Officers, are, for legal purposes, an extension of the corporation’s
own self.120 They control the daily operations of the corporation,
binding the entity for purposes of contract and tort obligations.121
In addition, notice given to and the knowledge of an officer can be
considered notice and knowledge of the entity, regardless of
whether the notice or knowledge was, in fact, communicated.122
While these are also consequences attendant to agency status generally, officers occupy a more elevated role than the average agent.
Officers, as contemplated in corporate jurisprudence, and realized
at most corporations, wield significant power and authority within
the corporate enterprise.123 They are also afforded considerable
first edition of this treatise that apart from the bylaws or authorization by the board of
directors, officers have relatively narrow inherent or presumptive authority.”).
118. See Grimes v. Alteon, Inc., 804 A.2d 256, 266 (Del. 2002) (holding that a CEO lacked
the authority to enter a contract to sell shares of stock because the statute required board
approval of such acts); ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 102, 110–12; BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN,
supra note 1, § 4.10[A] (“The term ‘management,’ however, is deemed to encompass ‘supervision, direction and control,’ while ‘the details of the business [may be] delegated to inferior
officers, agents and employees.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Canal Capital Corp. v.
French, No. 11764, 1992 Del. Ch. LEXIS 133, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 2, 1992)); Johnson & Ricca,
supra note 114, at 78–79 (“Typical functions of the officers include entering into ordinary
business transactions, devising business strategies, setting business goals, managing risks,
and generally working with subordinates to ‘[p]lan, direct, or coordinate operational activities.’”) (footnotes omitted).
119. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
120. See Goldman v. Shahmoon, 208 A.2d 492, 494 (Del. Ch. 1965) (“Officers as such are
the corporation.”); cf. Deborah A. DeMott, Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through an
Agency Lens, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 269, 270 (2015).
121. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 2, at 102 (“Legally speaking, the corporate officers are
agents of the company.”); COX & HAZEN, supra note 1, at 326 (“The officers of a corporation
are in legal theory the agents of the corporation.”). Directors, on the other hand, are not
agents of the corporation. See Automatic Self-Cleansing Filter Syndicate Co., Ltd. v. Cunninghame, 2 Ch. 34 (Eng. C.A. 1906).
122. See Kirschner v. KPMG LLP, 938 N.E.2d 941, 950–51 (N.Y. 2010) (imputing
knowledge of executive’s fraud to the corporation under agency principles for purposes of
the doctrine of in pari delicto defense).
123. Haft v. Dart Grp. Corp., 841 F. Supp. 549, 570 (D. Del. 1993) (“Basic to the law of
corporations is the notion that a corporate office embraces the right to exercise corporate
functions.”).
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discretion in their decision making. As made clear by the Delaware
Court of Chancery, “the terms officers and agents are by no means
interchangeable.”124
Agent status can apply to a broad array of individuals working
on behalf of a corporation.125 Examples range from the chief executive officer, to outside legal and financial advisors, to a checkout
clerk at the local franchise. Language in the case law, however,
indicates that corporate law contemplates “officers,” as being distinct from mere “employees,” articulating the difference as a result
of the discretionary authority or power to exercise corporate functions that officers, but not employees, possess.126 What constitutes
sufficient discretionary authority or power to rise to the level of an
officer is, however, less than clear.
At the extremes, delineating officers from other corporate agents
is not difficult. In the examples used above, one can easily distinguish a CEO from a checkout clerk. Likewise, outside legal and
financial advisors, by definition, will not by that role itself be considered part of the internal governance structure as an officer. The
exercise becomes much more challenging in the middle where individuals are afforded limited discretion in corporate affairs and
have ambiguous designations, thus allowing for considerable subjectivity, and consequently inconsistent, determinations regarding
their legal role. Given the distinct legal features attendant to “officer” status, distinguishing officers from other corporate agents ex
ante and ex post can carry with it significant legal consequences.

124. Goldman, 208 A.2d at 493–94 (stating that “there appears to be a historically rigid
view of the attributes which set a corporate officer apart from an employee. . . . Officers as
such are the corporation. An agent is an employee.”).
125. There are three elements necessary to establish an agency relationship: (1) mutual
consent between the principal and agent, (2) the agent agrees to act on the principal’s behalf,
and (3) the agent agrees to be subject to the principal’s control. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). The parties do not need to have contemplated that
an agency relationship be created, nor is the parties’ characterization of their relationship
in an agreement or in the context of industry or popular usage determinative of agency
status. See id. § 1.02. Rather, an agency relationship is created when all three elements are
present. See id.
126. See Goldman, 208 A.2d at 492–94 (finding person with “no discretionary authority
or power” not to be an “officer”); see also Haft, 841 F. Supp. at 570 (“Basic to the law of
corporations is the notion that a corporate office embraces the right to exercise corporate
functions. . . . Not every corporate employee is possessed of the authority and duty to exercise the powers of the corporation.”); CLARK, supra note 8, at 114 (“Generally, only the more
important executives in the corporation are called officers. Where the line is drawn is not
always clear . . . .”).
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C. The Need for a Definition
As explained in the previous section, corporate jurisprudence
and scholarship explore and delineate the various roles within the
corporate structure—director versus officer versus employees or
agent—vis-à-vis the legal consequences attendant to those roles.
Yet, to date, these resources fail to identify with any precision the
bounds of “officer” status itself. Corporate doctrine specific to officers is relatively new as compared to directors and agents, and thus
is underdeveloped.127 Analyzing and creating the law in this area
without linguistic certainty as to the term “officer” is both normatively and practically problematic. The following two examples illustrate why.
Officers are entrusted with managing vast aggregations of
wealth on behalf of the stockholders.128 “The existence and exercise
of this power carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders.”129 The Delaware Supreme Court explained officers’ fiduciary obligations in Gantler v.
Stephens, holding that “the fiduciary duties of officers are the same
as those of directors.”130 In situating officers in their own special
director-like fiduciary role within the corporation, Gantler and its
progeny make a well-defined dividing line between officer and ordinary agent status imperative. Corporate law makes clear that
the basis for imposing fiduciary duties on directors is the trusteelike role they occupy in the corporation and not because of any
agency relationship.131 As a result, there are important differences
127. See Shaner, supra note 9, at 367–70; Shaner, supra note 53, at 334; Shaner, supra
note 54, at 276.
128. See Myron T. Steele, The Moral Underpinnings of Delaware’s Modern Corporate
Fiduciary Duties, 26 NOTRE DAME J. L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 3, 14–18 (2012); Lynn A. Stout,
On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You Don’t Want To Invite Homo Economicus To Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3–4 (2003).
129. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); see Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law,
71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 808 (1983) (“[T]he risk of abuse which all fiduciary relations pose for
the entrustors is the main feature which triggers the application of fiduciary law, when the
protective mechanisms outside of fiduciary law cannot adequately eliminate this risk.”).
130. 965 A.2d 695, 708 (Del. 2009).
131. A director is not a legal agent of the corporation. The fiduciary nature of directors
arises from the statutorily dictated role of the board and the breadth of the board’s managerial power and responsibility. See In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215VCG, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (“The restrictions imposed by
Delaware case law set this boundary by requiring corporate officers and directors to act as
faithful fiduciaries to the corporation and its stockholders.”); Gorman v. Salamone, No.
10183-VCN, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *14 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2015) (“Section 141(a) . . .
establishes ‘the bedrock statutory principle of director primacy . . . .’”).
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between the content of directorial and agency fiduciary duties.132
Under current legal principles, officers, on the other hand, awkwardly straddle the agent-director fiduciary dichotomy. Scholars
disagree as to the proper classification of officers and case law and
treatises seem to point in both directions.133 Absent from the Gantler court’s opinion (or subsequent opinions) is clarity regarding
which corporate agents are the officers who owe the parallel fiduciary duties described by the court.134 Given that corporate statutes are similarly silent in defining “officer,” individuals and their
counsel are left to speculate as to which fiduciary principles they
are obliged to discharge—director or agency.135
Along similar lines, there is still much to be developed in the
way of officer fiduciary doctrine.136 Going forward, as courts tackle
the task of delineating the contours of officer fiduciary duties, “Who

132. These differences include, for example, the different standards of liability for the
duty of care—simple negligence for agents and gross negligence for directors. See Stone v.
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (discussing “the conduct giving rise to a violation of
the fiduciary duty of care (i.e., gross negligence)”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30–.31(AM.
BAR ASS’N 2016); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). In addition, agents owe the duties of care, loyalty, and obedience, while directors only owe the duties of care and loyalty. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2016); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–.12 (AM. LAW INST. 2006); BALOTTI
& FINKELSTEIN, supra note 1, § 4.13 at 4-113 (“[D]irectors [of a Delaware corporation] ‘owe
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders.’”) (quoting Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989)); ROBERT A. RAGAZZO &
FRANCES S. FENDLER, CLOSELY HELD BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, 104 (2d ed. 2012) (“The
law places three major duties on the agent: loyalty, care, and obedience.”).
133. See DeMott, supra note 2, at 850; A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Common Law Duties of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 BUS. LAW. 215,
217–20 (1992).
134. See Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance Survey, 71 BUS. LAW. 227, 239–40
(2016) (discussing the effects of this uncertainty).
135. While Professors Johnson and Ricca assert that officers’ lack of legal advice on fiduciary obligations is a result of the scant fiduciary duty doctrine, another significant factor
contributing to this state of affairs is the ambiguity surrounding who should be receiving
the advice. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 118, at 665–66 (discussing the lack of advice
officers receive regarding fiduciary duties).
136. This is a fact frequently noted by the Delaware courts. See Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 666 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“A lively debate exists regarding the degree to
which decisions by officers should be examined using the same standards of review developed for directors. Given how the parties have chosen to proceed, this decision need not
weigh in on these issues and intimates no view upon them.”) (citations omitted); Hampshire
Grp., Ltd. v. Kuttner, No. 3607-VCS, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, 2739995, at *35 (Del. Ch.
July 12, 2010) (“There are important and interesting questions about the extent to which
officers and employees should be more or less exposed to liability for breach of fiduciary
duty than corporate directors. The parties in this case have not delved into any of those
issues, and I see no justifiable reason for me to do so myself.”); see also Shaner, supra note
53, at 334.

SHANER_JCI2 (DO NOT DELETE)

556

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

12/18/2019 2:50 PM

[Vol. 54:527

is an officer?” is an essential consideration.137 How can courts articulate fiduciary obligations without a clear reference point as to
whom they apply? Indeed, the basis for imposing fiduciary duties,
the contours of those duties, and the applicable standards of judicial review differ in important respects depending on an individual’s legal status.138 Declaring and imposing legal obligations on
individuals without first making clear to whom they apply is a normatively problematic way of developing the law.
There are also strong pragmatic reasons why corporate law
needs a definition of “officer.” Because there is a lack of established
consensus in defining “officer,” parties will opportunistically define
it ex post in a way that suits their particular argument or position.
This may, however, be a very different definition than the ex ante
expectations regarding “officer” status. The case of Aleynikov v.
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc.139 illustrates this problem. In Aleynikov, the Third Circuit was tasked with interpreting Goldman’s advancement bylaw provisions.140 Specifically, the court had to decide
whether Sergey Aleynikov, who served as a vice president at Goldman, Sachs & Co., a subsidiary of Goldman, was included in the
definition of “officer.”141
137. See In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 114 n.6 (Del. Ch.
2009) (“In defining [fiduciary] duties, the courts balance specific policy considerations such
as the need to keep directors and officers accountable to shareholders and the degree to
which the threat of personal liability may discourage beneficial risk taking.”); Hickman &
Hill, supra note 107, at 1185.
138. See § 141(b); supra note 132. In addition, the standard of liability for a director’s
breach of the duty of care is gross negligence, while it is simple negligence for an agent. See
Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (discussing “the conduct giving rise to a violation of the
fiduciary duty of care (i.e., gross negligence)”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30–8.31 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2016); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.08 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). Further,
a director is not a legal agent of the corporation. The fiduciary nature of directors arises
from the statutorily director role of the board and the breadth of the board’s managerial
power and responsibility. See In re Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 5215-VCG,
2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 151, at *2 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12, 2011) (“The restrictions imposed by Delaware case law set this boundary by requiring corporate officers and directors to act as faithful fiduciaries to the corporation and its stockholders.”); Gorman v. Salamone, No. 10183VCN, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 202, at *14 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2015) (“Section 141(a) . . . establishes ‘the bedrock statutory principle of director primacy . . . .’”).
139. 765 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2014).
140. Id. at 353.
141. Id. Section 4.1 of Goldman’s bylaws authorized Goldman’s Board of Directors to
“elect [such officers as necessary, including] . . . one or more Vice Presidents.” Section 6.4 of
the bylaws contained a specific advancement provision for officers of Goldman Sachs Group
subsidiary companies which stated that
the term “officer,” . . . when used with respect to a Subsidiary . . . shall refer to
any person elected or appointed pursuant to the by-laws of such Subsidiary or
other enterprise or chosen in such manner as is prescribed by the by-laws . . .
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In analyzing the relevant bylaw provisions, the court concluded
that the term “officer” was ambiguous and allowed extrinsic evidence to be introduced to help determine its meaning.142 Citing to
several dictionary definitions of “officer,” the court stated that “the
plain meaning of the term officer is someone holding a position of
trust, authority, or command.”143 Interestingly, in articulating the
definition of “officer,” the court stated that “the election or appointment requirement cannot properly be considered a part of the ordinary, dictionary definition of officer.”144 This is in direct contrast
to decisions under the Bankruptcy Code and the 1934 Exchange
Act, which specifically tie “officer” status to election or appointment by the board.145 Ultimately, the court concluded that Aleynikov was not an “officer” covered by the advancement bylaw.146
In addition to the suit before the Third Circuit, Aleynikov had
filed a parallel suit seeking advancement in the Delaware Court of
Chancery.147 While noting that issue preclusion prevented re-litigating the interpretation issues previously resolved in the Third
Circuit decision, the court nonetheless indicated in dicta that the
Third Circuit had erred in finding that “officer” did not encompass
“vice presidents.”148 The court considered a broad body of evidence
in interpreting “officer” including the bylaw language itself, drafting history, the ordinary and plain meaning of the language at issue, industry standards/trade usage, corporate policy considerations, applicable state and federal government regulations, the
conduct of the parties themselves, and the transactional context.149
Ultimately, the court concluded that someone given the “title ‘Vice

[and] shall include in addition to any officer of such entity, any person serving
in a similar capacity or as the manager of such entity.
The Goldman Sachs Grp., Amended and Restated Bylaws (Form 8-K), Exh. at 14, 17–18
(May 28, 2013).
142. Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 353, 360–61.
143. Id. at 360–61.
144. Id. at 361.
145. See, e.g., Office of U.S. Tr. v. Fieldstone Mortg. Co., No. CCB-08-775, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 91479, at *11–14 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2008) (“[T]he fact of board appointment or election
is frequently identified as distinguishing ‘officer’ positions from other titled positions within
a corporation.”).
146. Aleynikov, 765 F.3d at 367.
147. Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 10636-VCL, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 222,
at *1 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2016).
148. See id. at *18–19.
149. Id. at *7–18.
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President’ could reasonably conclude that he was an ‘officer’ who
was entitled to advancement rights under the Bylaws.”150
The differing conclusions reached by the courts in the Aleynikov
litigation highlight the practical problems stemming from the ambiguity of “officer” status in corporate law. As both the Court of
Chancery and the New Jersey District court pointed out, “officer”
in the case of Goldman Sachs bylaws clearly includes someone with
the title of “vice president.” Indeed, both courts concluded that at
the time of Aleynikov’s receipt of the title of “Vice President,” the
parties believed he was an officer of the entity.151 Nevertheless,
capitalizing on the inherent ambiguity of such term, the corporation was able to successfully avoid its advancement obligations by
challenging the term ex post in litigation. With no consensus surrounding “officer” status as a general matter of law, parties may
strategically define “officer” to avoid legal obligations (as was the
case in Aleynikov) or, alternatively, apply legal obligations such as
fiduciary duties, even when ex ante the parties’ understanding of
“officer” was different.
A final development in corporate law necessitating the need for
definitional clarity with regard to “officer” is the private ordering
movement. With increasing frequency, the governing documents of
corporations are being used as a platform for defining and structuring key aspects of corporate governance.152 Corporate law provides corporations with the freedom to fashion their corporate offices as they see fit.153 This contractual freedom, coupled with the
150. Id. at *8. The District Court of New Jersey that originally heard the case similarly
found that “[t]he usual and ordinary meaning of vice president, supplemented by [precedent,] ma[de] out a fair case that the By-Laws here is unambiguous” and that the category
of “officers” in the Bylaws included a person with the title of “vice president.” Aleynikov v.
Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. Civ. 12-5994 (KM), 2013 U.S Dist. LEXIS 151603, at *55–56.
(D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2013).
151. Aleynikov, 2013 U.S. Dist. Lexis 151603, at *52–53; Aleynikov, 2016 Del. Ch. Lexis
222, at *15–16.
152. See Megan Wischmeier Shaner, Interpreting Organizational “Contracts” and the
Private Ordering of Public Company Governance, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 985, 996–1005
(2019) (describing the private ordering movement in corporate America).
153. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1381 (Del. 1996) (“At its core, the Delaware
General Corporation Law is a broad enabling act which leaves latitude for substantial private ordering[s].”); supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also COX & HAZEN, supra note
1, at 143 (“Under the corporation acts of most states, wide latitude is given to the organizers
to include in the articles certain optional provisions and to make certain special variations
on the ordinary rules prescribed by statute”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Delaware’s Corporate-Law
System: Is Corporate America Buying an Exquisite Jewel or a Diamond in the Rough? A
Response to Kahan & Kamar’s Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 1257, 1260 (2001) (describing the DGCL as creating “a wide realm for
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existing uncertainties surrounding officer duties and liabilities,
makes corporate officers a ripe area for private ordering. Indeed, a
task force of the American Bar Association has begun looking at
just such matters.154 In order for private ordering in this space to
be effective and fair, a set of standard default rules or definitions
from which parties can then deviate is necessary.155 In the absence
of a set of standard defaults, parties incur material transaction
costs in the drafting process.156 Even more concerning, private ordering in the absence of legal defaults results in “unique provisions
that lead to ad hoc judicial decisions interpreting specific provisions that provide no predictability in future cases [because the
provisions] are often poorly drafted and unclear, leading to increased litigation costs and inefficiencies for all parties.”157 Establishing a uniform understanding of what “officer” means for purposes of corporate law would serve as a solid foundation for private
ordering and interpreting such contracting going forward.
D. Considerations in Crafting a Definition
There are several lessons to be learned from the struggles in defining and interpreting “officer” in areas outside of corporate law.
First are the tiered definitions of officers. In securities laws, for
example, “officer” is defined somewhat broadly while “executive officer” captures a narrower set of individuals.158 In contrast to officers, executive officers are subject to more stringent reporting requirements and automatic liability for certain transactions.159 The
definitions in the ALI’s Corporate Governance Principles similarly
propose different ranks within “officer” status—“officer,”160 and

private ordering”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Putting Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed
Complaint, 69 BUS. LAW. 1, 56–57 (2013).
154. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
155. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual
Freedom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 11, 11–13 (Mark Lowenstein & Robert Hillman eds. 2014).
156. See id. at 11–12. These transaction costs occur, in part, because parties “cannot rely
on their understandings of default principles of law. Instead, they must evaluate entityspecific provisions, ostensibly bargained for on an investment-by-investment basis to protect their interests.” Id. at 12.
157. Id. at 12. Chief Justice Strine and Vice Chancellor Laster have discussed these
problems in the context of limited liability companies and limited partnerships, which enjoy
unlimited contractual freedom with few statutory defaults. Id. at 11.
158. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 79–80, 169–70 and accompanying text.
160. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 51, § 1.27.
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“principal executive officer.”161 The Principles distinguish the substantive legal treatment applicable to an individual based on the
exact officer classification.162 While all “officers” owe, for example,
the duty of care,163 a smaller subset of this group is subject to the
disclosure obligations regarding corporate opportunities,164 and a
smaller group yet—principal executive officers—are vested with
director-like management authority and subject to other obligations.165 State statutes do not, however, employ different types of
officers as these other resources do. Nor do state corporate statutes
make distinctions within the category of “officer.”166 Thus, in crafting a definition for “officer” that will work for corporate statutes as
currently drafted, such definition must be flexible enough to encompass all of the different references to, and uses of “officer.”167
The second, perhaps more complicated, consideration to take
into account in designing a cohesive definition is the subjective versus objective approaches employed by courts in determining “officer” status. This has also been described as the “legal officers”
versus “traditional officers” debate.168 In both the securities and
bankruptcy contexts, courts disagree whether “officer” status
should be determined based on (1) objective criteria such as title
and director election or appointment,169 or (2) subjective, functional criteria such as responsibilities, duties, access to information or financial resources.170 Advocates of an objective, legal
161. See id. § 3.01.
162. See id. § 1.27, cmt. c.
163. See id. at Part IV.
164. See id. § 5.02 (Transactions with the Corporation).
165. See id. § 3.01; see also id. § 5.15 (Transfer of Control in Which a Director or Principal
Senior Executive is Interested).
166. The Delaware General Corporation Law, for example, does not differentiate between its references to “officer” throughout its provisions. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141(e) (directors ability to rely on officers of the corporation); § 142 (providing for officers in
the corporation); § 145 (providing for indemnification and advancement for officers); § 225
(determining the validity of officer appointment and removal). The statute does, however,
delineate between directors, officers, employees, and agents. See, e.g., § 145 (referencing
each of these different corporate roles for purposes of indemnification and advancement); §
141(e) (referencing officers and employees separately).
167. Alternatively, states could amend their corporate statutes to provide for different
types of officers akin to that employed by securities laws and the ALI Principles.
168. See Office of U.S. Tr. v. Fieldstone Mortg. Co., No. CCB-08-755, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 91479, 1, at *8–9 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2008) (discussing the difference between the legal
definition of “officer” and officers in the “traditional” sense (i.e., function)).
169. See, e.g., id. at *8.
170. See, e.g., C.R.A. Realty Corp. v. Crotty, 878 F.2d 562, 563 (2d Cir. 1989); Colby v.
Klune, 178 F.2d 872, 873, 975 (2d Cir. 1949). Some courts have sought a middle ground on
this debate, looking first to titles and then analyzing subjective factors. See, e.g., Winston v.
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approach to defining “officer” cite to the clear guidance it provides
to market actors. Courts employing the subjective, pragmatic approach push back on this argument, asserting that a title-focused
approach is akin to strict liability and “places responsibility for meticulous observance of the provision upon the shoulders of the insider, and he or she must bear the risk of any inadvertent miscalculation.”171
The consideration first raised—the lack of different degrees of
“officer” in corporate codes—may actually dictate the answer to the
second consideration—whether to employ a subjective or objective
approach. A definition of “officer” must be flexible enough to work
for all of the different references to “officer” in state corporate statutes. Unlike the more rigid objective approach, the subjective approach leaves room for consideration of the specific statute’s policy
and purpose in defining “officer.”172 This would allow for a more
nuanced definition of “officer” that could span the different instances when that term is used in the statute. Further, a subjective
approach would accommodate the freedom in creating offices that
corporate law allows as well as the varying duties officers may
have across and within corporations.173
E. A Proposal: Establishing the “Officer” Prototype
As previously discussed, the law specifies different consequences
that attach to different categories of corporate actors—directors,
officers, stockholders, agents, employees. To avoid incoherent and
Fed. Exp. Corp., 853 F.2d 455, 457 (6th Cir. 1988); Nat’l Med. Enterprs., Inc. v. Small, 680
F.2d 83, 84 (9th Cir. 1982).
171. 14 CAROL A. JONES, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §
6857.15 (2012) (Liability for Short Swing Trading Under Section 16(b)—Definition of Director and Officer Under Section 16(b).
172. See In re NMI Sys., Inc., 179 B.R. 357, 370 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1995) (defining “officer”
status under Section 101(31) of the Bankruptcy Code in light of the specific preference statute that referenced the term and concluding that “officer” status was based on whether the
individual was “in the inner circle making the company’s critical financial decisions”);
C.R.A. Realty Corp., 878 F.2d at 567 (concluding that “officer” status arises when the employee had access to confidential information that could permit the employee to take actions
that Section 16(b) seeks to prohibit); see also Erens, supra note 69, at *3 (“Courts, however,
are not likely simply to adopt the definition of “officer” in Rule 16a-1(f) for purposes of determining who is an officer under the Bankruptcy Code under Section 503(c). Among other
things, a functional approach to determining the contours of the definition requires that a
court look to the purpose of Section 503(c), which differs from the purpose of Section 16 of
the Securities Act.”).
173. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (describing the enabling nature of
corporate law and flexibility in creating corporate offices).
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inconsistent application of the law, criteria for membership in any
particular category must be established.174 Scholars in law, psychology, and philosophy have studied the topic of categories and
developed theories surrounding category formation.175 One identified model is the prototype-centered category. A prototype-centered category may be defined through identification of one or more
prototypes (i.e., an example of “what [the] category most obviously
includes”) or, alternatively, it may be based on some number of
features generally common to the prototype.176 The prototype-centered model of category is often used in creating and applying legal
principles.177
Two examples in business law that employ a prototype-centered
category in determining legal status are agency law and partnership law. The test for establishing principal-agent status flows
from the definition of “agency” in section 1.01 of the Restatement
(Third) of Agency: “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises
when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person
(an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and
subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent
or otherwise consents so to act.”178 Based on this definition, courts
have identified three requisite characteristics for an agency relationship to exist: (1) mutual agreement, (2) the agent must act on
behalf of the principal, and (3) the agent will act subject to the
principal’s control.179 Courts use these specific features to differentiate a legal agency relationship from other uses and understandings of “agency” (for example, commercial, economic, philosophical,
and literary definitions).180 The comments to section 1.01 of the Restatement illustrate the prototype-focused approach of determining

174. See Hickman & Hill, supra note 107, at 1185–86 (discussing theories of categories
across disciplines).
175. See id. at 1186. Three of the main views on category formation discussed in the
literature are (1) necessary and sufficient conditions categories, (2) prototype-centered categories, and (3) goal-centered categories. See id.
176. Id. at 1186, 1190.
177. Id. at 1191 (“Given the reliance of ordinary language on prototypes, it is not surprising that legal categories often center on prototypes as well.”).
178. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
179. See RAGAZZO & FENDLER, supra note 132, at 7. In determining whether these characteristics are present, courts employ a fact-specific analysis.
180. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (discussing
the different understandings of “agency”).
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agency status, distinguishing the agency prototype from other legal relationships (e.g., debtor-creditor, bailor-bailee) based on the
absence of specific features common to an agency relationship.181
A partnership is defined as an “association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.”182 Because
there is no bright-line test for resolving disputes over the characterization of profit-sharing, courts have also looked to different factors in determining the existence of a partnership. Those include
“(1) a community of interest in the venture, (2) an agreement to
share profits, (3) an agreement to share losses, and (4) a mutual
right of control or management of the enterprise.”183 A potential
fifth factor, the parties’ own characterization of their relationship,
is sometimes also taken into consideration but courts are clear that
such characterization is not dispositive.184 Like agency law, determining partner status is a case-by-case, fact-specific analysis. Also,
like agency status, the legal category of “partnership” is prototypecentered with the partnership prototype being defined in relation
to the absence or presence of the common features outlined above.
In light of the lack of a specific statutory definition, “officer” status should be analyzed in a prototype-centered manner similar to
that of agency and partnership status. First, when the law uses a
term from ordinary language, such as “officer,” a prototype-centered category is well suited to define the scope of that legal category.185 As explained by Professors Kristin Hickman and Claire
Hill:
For most words, terms, and concepts, we quickly recognize some clear
examples. We can also readily imagine cases that are murkier. The
Pope and a thirteen-year-old boy, while meeting the formal definition
of bachelor, are certainly not prototypical. The obvious instances represent the category’s core, while the more questionable ones are at the
category’s penumbra.186

181. Id. § 1.01 cmt. c.
182. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1914); REVISED UNIFORM P’SHIP ACT §
202(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997).
183. See Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176 (Tex. 1997).
184. See id. at 176–77.
185. Hickman & Hill, supra note 107, at 1191; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) AGENCY § 1.01
cmt. b. (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“Moreover, the terminology of agency is widely used in commercial settings and academic literature to characterize relationships that are not necessarily encompassed by the legal definition of agency.”).
186. Hickman & Hill, supra note 107, at 1191.
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Obvious examples like a CEO, CFO, or COO represent the core of
the “officer” category while roles such as vice president, vice secretary, and vice treasurer are more attenuated and raise questions
as to “officer” status and thus make up the penumbra of “officers.”
A prototype-centered approach to defining “officer” is further fitting as it allows for a subjective, functional based component in the
analysis. As discussed in section III.D, a subjective approach accommodates the different statutory provisions throughout corporate statutes that use “officer” as well as the wide variation in officer titling and appointment that occurs in today’s corporations. A
prototype-centered definition of “officer” would be based on some
number of features generally common to the officer prototype, thus
taking into account the substance of the officer role before attaching legal consequences. The proposed test avoids a fixed definition
tied to formal titles in lieu of a list of factors that embody the substance of the officer role that corporate law seeks to regulate. Accordingly, using characteristics of corporate officers frequently
identified by courts and scholars, the following factors should be
considered in determining “officer” status.
Title given to the individual.187
* Articulation of the office held in the corporation’s governing
documents.188
* Appointed or elected by the board (or an officer with delegated appointment authority).189
*

187. See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1959) (finding officer title to be per
se evidence of Section 16 liability under the 1934 Exchange Act); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259
F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a) (“Every corporation
. . . shall have such officers with such titles and duties as shall be stated in the bylaws or in
a resolution of the board . . . .”). But see In re Foothills Texas, Inc., 408 B.R. 573, 579 (2009)
(determining “officer” status and stating that “the mere title of a person does not end the
inquiry”).
188. See § 142(a) (providing that the officers may be provided for in the bylaws).
189. See id. § 142(a) (providing for director appointment of officers); Office of U.S. Tr. v.
Fieldstone Mortg. Co., No. CCB-08-775, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91479, at *12–14 (D. Md.
Nov. 5, 2008) (“[T]he fact of board appointment or election is frequently identified is distinguishing ‘officer’ positions from other titled positions within a corporation.”). But see Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that the “election
or appointment requirement cannot properly be considered a part of the ordinary, dictionary
definition of officer”). Officers can also appoint other officers if such power is provided in the
governing documents or delegated by the board. See § 142(a); Transcript of Record at 23,
Kale v. Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., No. 6393-VCS, 2011 WL 11071500 (Del. Ch. June 13,
2011) (“[A]nd when the bylaws of the company let officers, key officers make other officers,
I think it’s pretty, to me—there’s no real rebuttal evidence.”); Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs
Grp., Inc., No. 10636-VCL, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 222, at *16 (Del. Ch. July 13, 2016) (noting
that the bylaws allowed officers to appoint other officers).
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Industry custom/standards.190
* Involvement in policymaking functions for the corporation.191
* Exercises discretionary authority or power in managerial
decision making (e.g., exercising the power of the corporation).192
* Occupies a position of trust, which can include performing
duties that would allow the individual access to financial information or other confidential information about the corporation’s affairs such that the individual could “exert undue
influence over corporate decisions.”193
*

These factors take into account both the legal and traditional
roles of officers in the corporation. Courts should look at the totality of the circumstances in determining “officer” status, and no one
of the factors in the above list should be wholly dispositive. The
factor-based test proposed here directly rejects prior case law basing “officer” status solely on labels or election/appointment by the
board.194 As a prototype-based category, there is a “concern . . .
that, in the absence of meaningful constraints against minimal
compliance pressures, a category’s coverage may become incoherent and inconsistent, and the category may operate to treat in the

190. See Aleynikov, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 222, at *15–17 (citing to banking industry customs and standards in interpreting “officer”).
191. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 51, § 1.27(b); In re NMI Sys., Inc., 179 B.R. 357,
369–70 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1995) (stating that officers are “active in setting overall corporate
policy”); see also W.H. Elliott & Sons Co. v. Gotthardt, 305 F.2d 544, 545 (1st Cir. 1962) (a
factor cited in a common law breach of fiduciary duty claims case brought by creditors);
Officer, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining officer as “a person who holds an
office of trust, authority, or command.”); Officer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2009) (“One who holds an office of trust, authority, or command.”).
192. See Haft v. Dart Grp. Corp., 841 F. Supp. 549, 570 (D. Del. 1993) (“Basic to the law
of corporations is the notion that a corporate office embraces the right to exercise corporate
functions. . . . Not every corporate employee is possessed of the authority and duty to exercise the powers of the corporation.”); Goldman v. Shahmoon, 208 A.2d 492, 493–95 (Del. Ch.
1965) (finding person with “no discretionary authority or power” not to be an “officer”); John
Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
35, 65 (2014) (describing “officers” as “executives, tasked with making decisions about the
running of the company” and holding “power to initiate corporate decision-making”); Sparks
& Hamermesh, supra note 133, at 216 (describing an “officer” as a person entrusted with
“administrative and executive functions” but not one who lacks “judgement or discretion as
to corporate matters”).
193. In re NMI, Sys., Inc., 179 B.R. at 370; see C.R.A. Realty Corp. v. Crotty, 878 F.2d
562, 567 (2d Cir. 1989); Colby v. Kline, 178 F.2d 873, 873 (2d Cir. 1949).
194. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.

SHANER_JCI2 (DO NOT DELETE)

566

12/18/2019 2:50 PM

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:527

same way things that do not seem to bear any substance-based relationship to one another.”195 The per se “officer” test applied by
the courts in fact, does just that by basing categorization on minimal qualifications such as title and appointment thereby capturing
substantive and shallow “officers” alike in the category. Instead,
this paper proposes a holistic approach that considers all relevant
“officer” characteristics. Moreover, the proposed approach is consistent with the fact-specific, case-by-case analysis that is characteristic of corporate law.196
CONCLUSION
Corporate law is clear that “officers” play a distinct legal role
within the corporation. Yet ambiguity persists in determining who
exactly occupies this space. State statues, cases, corporate governing documents, and academic scholarship have all, to date, avoided
squarely addressing the question “Who is an ‘officer’ of a corporation?” The lack of consensus in delineating “officer” status has allowed parties to opportunistically choose definitions that support
their ex post interests.197 And the courts differ in their interpretation and identification of officers leading to inconsistent and incoherent results.198 At this juncture, corporations, directors, officers,
stockholders, and third parties alike live in a state of uncertainty
and unpredictability with respect to these important corporate actors.
In addition to these pragmatic problems, the ambiguity in defining “officer” has contributed to the marginalization of officer doctrine, in particular the development of fiduciary duties. How can
courts, parties, and scholars engage in a thoughtful, informed dialogue regarding the proper role and accountability for officers if
there is not a clear understanding of who an “officer” is? How can
legal counsel adequately advise these key management members
of their legal responsibilities if the law makes it unpredictable as

195. Hickman & Hill, supra note 107, at 1195.
196. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. Another example of an area of corporate law employing this type of balancing test is the corporate opportunity doctrine. See
Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (1996).
197. See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text.
198. Compare Office of U.S. Tr. v. Fieldstone Mortg. Co., No. CCB-08-775, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 91479 at *12–16 (D. Md. Nov. 5, 2008) (relying on board election/appointment
as determiner of “officer” status), with Aleynikov v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 765 F.3d 350,
361 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that board appointment was not a determiner of “officer” status).

SHANER_JCI2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

12/18/2019 2:50 PM

CORPORATE CHAMELEON

567

to whom these rights, responsibilities, and liabilities will apply?
And in an era of private ordering, how can parties engage in efficient, fair contracting regarding officers if the default legal principles from which they are operating are undefined?
This Article attempts to remedy the definitional fluidity attached to “officer.” A prototype-centered officer category based on
both objective and subjective factors allows for a nuanced, yet consistent definition that can function under existing corporate statutory regimes. Hopefully, as the category of “officer” becomes stabilized in corporate law, the legal consequences attached to that
status will similarly become clear.

